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The Community cannot act at its discretion to deal with work-
force reductions; it needs the legal power to act under the provisions
of the EEC Treaty. The legal power of the Community to act in the
field of social law was contested originally. Therefore, the first in-
strument of the Community which is of interest for our discussion
here did not emerge in the field of labor law, but in the field of
company law, since the Community has clear legal power to harmonize
company law and to create instruments to permit trans-frontier merg-
ers and trans-frontier cooperation of companies. In this connection
mention should therefore be made of the European Company Statute
which includes comprehensive rules on employee participation, offers
possibilities for trans-border collective bargaining, and embodies an
elaborate system of Works Councils.'
I should particularly specify one instrument which also is mentioned
in the European Companies Statute. It is a "Group Works Council." 2
The Group Works Council is well known in the Netherlands. The
so-called "Koncern ondernemingsraad" spread from the European
Company to Germany in 1972 and then to France in 1982, where
such an institution now exists. You can gather that our discussion
is indirectly influenced by the European Company draft statute.
A second instrument of company law that should also be mentioned
is the so-called draft Fifth Directive on the structure of stock cor-
porations.3 This directive seeks to ensure that management, when
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making decisions, takes into account interests other than those of
the capital owners. The idea behind the directive is that, to be
legitimate, management decisions should include the participants of
to the workers and, therefore, the directive initially envisaged worker
representatives in the boardroom. But discussion of this proposal
resulted in accepting, instead of employee representatives in the board-
room, employees' representation through works councils. In any event,
those employee representatives, either in the boardroom or in the
works councils, are to be informed and consulted when important
decisions affecting the enterprise are made, such as at plant closings.
Now let us turn to labor law. There was indeed a big dispute when
the EEC Treaty was negotiated, which is still reflected in article 117
of the EEC Treaty. The issue was whether social harmonization is
a condition precedent for the establishment of a common market,
or whether social harmonization follows automatically thereafter.
Many developments have now given emphasis to the first thesis, so
that the Community can intervene on the basis of article 100 of the
EEC Treaty which provides that legal divergencies which have an
impact on the common market need to be eliminated. There is indeed
much evidence that divergencies in the system of labor protection
have an impact on the functioning of the Common Market, and
therefore need to be eliminated.
There have also been factual developments. Although Professor
Blanpain mentioned more recent ones, I only specify one case of
1972: the AKZO case. AKZO, a Dutch concern, envisaged proceeding
first to plant closings in Germany, but the German representatives
said, "no, do that in Holland"; the Dutch employee representatives
replied, "oh, don't do that in Holland. If you want to proceed to
plant closings, do them in Germany." It should be noted that this
was a good example of lack of trade union solidarity.
The final outcome was that plants were closed in Belgium because,
as you heard from Mr. Desolre's comments the Belgian law was only
subsequently modified to protect workers sufficiently against dis-
missals. The AKZO case gave rise to extensive discussion in the
European Parliament 4 and served, indeed, as strong support for the
thesis that the divergency in the legislation in the member states could
affect the functioning of the Common Market and lead to production
shifts from one country to another. This is the so-called "Delaware
40.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 148) (1972) (Debates of European Parliment).
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effect" which is well known to our American friends. The effect of
such legal incentives on shifts in production needed to be eliminated;
everybody agreed this should be effected under rules on the approx-
imation of legislations in the EEC.
Further, there were political developments. In 1972, the eve of the
first Community enlargement, the Heads of State declared, at the
Summit Conference in Paris, that the creation of a social union was
as important as the creation of an economic and monetary union.5
In 1974 the Council adopted a social action program which provides
for the effective participation of employees during the life of the
undertaking. Another development that occurred a judicial one. The
Court of Justice held in the second Deferenne case6 that the
Community had the power to eliminate discrimination, even when
not obvious, in the area of equal pay to men and women. Obvious
discriminations are directly forbidden by article 119 of the EEC
Treaty, but hidden discriminations were to be eliminated through the
harmonization of legislation under articles 100 and 235. Accordingly,
these articles were said to lead to the realization of the social objectives
of the EEC, set forth in article 117. Thus, it was made certain that
the Community has power, in acting under article 100, to bring about
the social objectives of the EEC. The concrete outcome of this
development was, as has been mentioned, a Directive of 1975 on
collective redundancies, 7 which the Council adopted and the member
states incorporated in their legislation. However, we did have some
problems. One concerned Belgium, as already mentioned; another
one concerned Italy.
Let me make some remarks on the situation in Italy because the Ital-
ian Government transformed the Mass Dismissals Directive by means of
collective agreements. The question in a case involving Italy,8 which
was prior to the already-mentioned Belgian case, concerned whether
collective agreements are the proper way of implementing the Mass
Dismissal Directive or whether legislative action was needed. It was
Final Declaration of the Summit Conference in Paris, 10 EUR. COMM. BULL.
24 (1972).
6 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societ6 Anonyme Belgede Navigation Aerienne Sabena,
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455 (Preliminary Ruling).
7 Council Directive of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to collective redundancies, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
48) 29 (1975).
1 Comm'n of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2133.
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not easy to give a straightforward answer because the legal status of
collective agreements was considerably different from one country to
another. In some countries' collective agreements have legal force as
soon as they are declared generally applicable. This is the case in
Germany, and as far as I know, in Belgium. There are other countries
in which the status of collective agreements, is extremely uncertain.
In the case before the Court of Justice of the European Communities9
of the implementation of the directive in Italy, indeed, the Advocate
General argued that collective agreements are not the proper way
of implementing the Directive on Mass Dismissal. The Court did not
go that far and, I think, rightly so. The Court only complained that
the collective agreements did not cover all employees. The Court
accepted collective agreements, providing they cover all the employees
which were meant to benefit from the Directive. The Commission
has drawn some conclusions from this approach and has pointed out
that collective agreements are, for instance, a good Way to implement
the so-called draft Fifth Company Directive regarding employee par-
ticipation. There must, however, exist legal means to ensure that the
workers really receive the rights provided for by this Directive.
In situations where the collective agreements do not cover all the
workers, or where their content is insufficient, other legal instruments
have to be added.
It is useful to reiterate a distinction, a distinction which we have
already made between the two obligations of the employer under the
Mass Dismissals Directive. One obligation is to inform the public
authorities, but it is an obligation to provide information only. I
think The Netherlands is not the only country which imposes a more
far reaching obligation of asking for the consent of such authorities
before dismissal may occurr; in France the situation is similar to the
one in The Netherlands. Surprisingly, in France labor law questions
are dealt with by public tribunals. This is not conceivable under the
German legal system, but this is a matter for discussion later on.
In any event, no one is obliged under the Mass Dismissal Directive
to create a system of administrative authorization. All that is required
is that the public authorities be informed. As Mr. Yemin has correctly
pointed out in his book, the reason for this requirement is that in
exercising their duties and looking to ensure full employment public




The second obligation of the employer is to inform the employee
representatives and to consult them in order to reach an agreement.
I found the distinction made by Dean Beaird about the economic
decision itself and its social effects very interesting. This distinction
underlines all our work in this area, which is now quite clearly out
lined in the "Vredeling Draft Directive," or rather the former "Vre-
deling Directive" or "Richard Sutherland Directive," or whatever
one may call it.
The distinction between the economic decision and its social con-
sequences has come up through a case which was commenced by the
Danish unions.' 0 The case was not complicated. It involved a case
of bankruptcy, where neither the employer nor the trustee in bank-
ruptcy consulted the employee representatives before dismissing the
employees. The issue was whether or not the employer had an ob-
ligation to consult them before the bankruptcy. The Court answered
in the negative. It answered that the Directive protects the employees.
However, it would be a misuse of this Directive to pretend there
should be a consultation if the dismissal is not intentional, but a
result of a judicial decision.
A distinction should be made between the obligations to inform
the public authorities, on the one hand, and the employee represen-
tatives on the other. The employer must already have a draft the
moment he informs the authorities and the consultation must take
place at an earlier stage. Thus, he has to enter into consultation and
negotiation with the employee representatives just before having his
draft decision completed. This requirement is a consequence of the
judgment of the E.C. Court of Justice in the action brought by the
Danish Unions, February 12, 1985.
Of course, the Community did not end its consideration of the
question of dismissal with the Directive of 1975. The Directive of
1977 deals with acquired rights in cases of transfer of undertakingsII
but this is not the focus of our discussion today. However, we do
have to deal with the situation where the functions of the employer
are not concentrated within one person or management body, but
,0 C.J.E.C. 284/83, Dansk Metalarbejderforbund v. Nielsen, Case 284/83 of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (judgment of Feb. 12, 1985) (un-
recorded case).
" Council Directive of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 61) 26 (1977).
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where they are split into different levels of the decisionmaking process
of an undertaking with a complex structure. Its relation with the
problem raised by groups of companies is clear. As you know,
personnel decisions are normally made at the local level, but this is
true only to a certain extent. For senior staff, the decision is quite
often made at the top level. For example, Detroit decides who becomes
manager at the different plants of Ford; it is not the local workers
who decide on the senior jobs of its management, at least not of-
ficially. In reality, an employer's functions are split into different
levels. Economic decisions are most often made at the group level,
whereas the local level decides how those decisions will affect local
workers. In short, higher management decides if closings and dis-
missals are necessary; lower management more often decides which
employees will be dismissed.
Originally, the draft Vredeling Directive12 was intended to cope
with these situations; subsequently the approach was made on a larger
scale. Now it is no longer a secret that what is envisaged is the duty
by the employer to inform employees regarding the running of the
undertaking, including their consultation prior to any important de-
cision.
Concerning the decision to inform or consult, it is appropriate to
emphasize the distinction between the economic decision itself and
its social effects. The employer has an obligation to consult employee
representatives, but the draft directive does not go further. Regarding
the social consequences, the draft Directive reiterates the obligation
imposed on the employer by the directive of 1975 to consult employee
representatives with the aim of reaching an agreement. This involves
more than only a simple consultation; the employer must bargain to
find a solution. What happens if no solution is found? In the draft
Mass Dismissals Directive the Commission initially sought to create
an arbitration procedure as was envisaged for the European company,
but this attempt failed since the Council Ministers of the Community
rejected it. The Germans will use arbitration, since their system makes
use of arbitration; in fact, other member states will since it is left to the
discretion of the member states. Under the draft Vredeling Directive,
it would be the same. Nothing is provided if no agreement is reached.
The limits of the obligation to find a solution are quite clear.
What remains doubtful is who should give the information re-
quested and how it should work. The initial directive provided that
,2 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 2 (1980).
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if the local management failed to give information or to consult the
employee representatives, they had a right of direct access to top
management. In its deliberation on the subject the European Parlia-
ment imposed an obligation on the dominant undertaking to
provide information to the local management, to facilitate meaningful
consultation at the local level. The revised draft directive' 3 took
advantage of this view and provided in the explanation of the draft
that, indeed, these rules intend that local management be a real
decisionmaker.
Accordingly, under the revised draft Directive the dominant un-
dertaking will have to provide information and the local management
will have to transmit it to the employee representatives. However, the
experts of the member states considered this too difficult. The Irish president
of the Council suggested in 1984 that the employer provide this
information, and that "connected persons" be required to give him
the information he needs. It is too early to comment on all the details
of the draft Directive. You have certainly read in the newspapers
that the directive is blocked since one member, the United Kingdom,
opposes it.
I do not think this means the end of the "Vredeling" Directive
since at the Community level things move in such a way that this
impasse may come to an end. Another case may serve as a precedent,
the so-called "Economic Interest Grouping." It concerns cross-
frontier cooperation of undertakings and is not related to labor law.
-For a long time, this 1974 proposal of the Commission
was almost forgotten; now it has been adopted by the Council. 14 At
the European level things do not move as quickly as they may at
the national level, but nuances have to be made. I am still very
hopeful that the British resistance to proposed "Vredeling"
Directive will be overcome in the near future.
Amendment to the proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing
and consulting employers, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983). Cf. VREDELING
& BLANPAIN, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL (1983); Pipkorn, The Draft Directive on
Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
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